A Framework for Policy Based Secure Intra Vehicle Communication by Hamad, Mohammad et al.
A Framework for Policy Based Secure Intra Vehicle
Communication
Mohammad Hamad∗, Marcus Nolte†, Vassilis Prevelakis∗
∗Institute of Computer and Network Engineering, TU Braunschweig
{mhamad,prevelakis}@ida.ing.tu-bs.de
†Institute of Control Engineering, TU Braunschweig
nolte@ifr.ing.tu-bs.de
Abstract—Over the past two decades, significant developments
were introduced within the vehicular domain, evolving the
modern vehicle into a network of dozens of embedded systems
each hosting one or more applications. Communications within
this distributed environment while adhering to safety-critical
and secure systems guidelines implies the formulation of a
comprehensive and consistent communications policy. Creating
this policy is a complex, error-prone and labor-intensive task,
requiring detailed knowledge of possible communication paths
between all possible components of the system. For this reason,
it is often skipped, trusting that each task will behave as
intended and interact only with its peers. Traditional testing
provides sufficient confidence to allow certification. Nevertheless,
the existing process ignores malicious interference, whereby an
adversary compromises a low-criticality process or subsystem
and uses that to attack other subsystems, effectively taking over
the vehicle. In this paper, we propose a framework to build a
secure communications policy gradually by integrating it through
the design and life cycle of vehicle’s software components. We
also propose a security module which acts as a connection policy
checker vetting the incoming and outgoing communications and
enforcing the distributed security policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, E/E systems in the automotive domain
have become increasingly complex [1]. Driven e.g. by the
integration of advanced driver assistance systems, electronic
instrument clusters or entertainment systems, modern vehicles
rely on a distributed embedded system. A modern car contains
more than 70 microcontroller-based computers [2], known as
electronic control units (ECUs). These ECUs are distributed
throughout the vehicle and are interconnected using different
bus systems such as CAN, MOST or FlexRay. Recent trends
also show a tendency to integrate Ethernet-based communi-
cations [3]. More than 100 millions Lines Of software Code
(LOC) [4] are integrated into a premium vehicle to control
different functions, which are ranging from mundane such as
controlling courtesy lights to highly critical applications such
as engine control.
Within the vehicle, multiple ECUs typically share a com-
mon bus. These sub networks are often connected to other
parts of the vehicle networks via gateways. This kind of
network architecture is supposed to satisfy the complex inter-
action requirements between the different systems. The high
degree of interconnectivity in the vehicle is not only driven by
the desire for safety (e.g. by connecting multiple sensors in
different parts of the vehicle to processing ECUs), but also by
comfort considerations (e.g. in case an audio system needs to
read the vehicle’s velocity to adjust the sound volume ). On the
other hand, the unrestricted interaction between components
of heterogeneous criticality may also create vulnerabilities
from a security perspective [5].
The traditional approach focuses on providing a functional
system. The aim is to minimize glitches not only because these
may affect the safety of the vehicle, but because even minor
ones may lead to customer complaints and expensive recalls.
Failure analysis and statistical models have proven quite useful
at identifying likely areas that may cause problems. This
approach, however, does not address interference by malicious
adversaries who base their attacks on the exploitation of
improbable scenarios (e.g. race conditions, malformed inputs,
etc.). Moreover, functionality and safety testing techniques
which are used to test the vehicle components are insufficient
for catching security vulnerabilities [6], even those which
are well-known vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows [7],
which have recently been discovered in the vehicle compo-
nents and have been exploited [8].
The security posture of the vehicle is further complicated
by the fact that is an amalgamation of different software
components, written by different teams with widely varying
degrees of competence. Safety-critical components comprise
very high-quality code and are extensively tested, while others,
may simply be off-the-shelf (COTS) code that has been
integrated into an ECU (e.g. the entertainment system may
be essentially a repurposed personal computer, running an
embedded version of Linux [9]). This disparity in the code
quality provides the attacker with targets of opportunity as
well as the means to gain access to vulnerable software
components without the need of physical access to the vehicle
[10]. Wireless paths, used not only for V2X communications,
but commonplace channels such as Bluetooth, WiFi, cellular,
digital radio, even tire-pressure sensors, allow external access
to systems on board the vehicle. What is worse, is that
these systems primarily involve the off-the-shelf code of
mixed quality and large size, usually as a result of poor
customization. Hence, such software components can provide
limited resistance against a well motivated and trained attacker
and to expect otherwise is probably unwise in the face of
market realities. The lack of internal security barriers means
that having compromised one subsystem, the attacker can end
up controlling the entire vehicle (e.g. even stopping of the
engine) [11].
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Therefore, to keep security attacks from spreading across
the system, it is imperative to control the communications
between system components by defining who should talk to
whom. By doing that, we provide a level of compartmental-
ization in the in-vehicle network. With this precondition, a
malicious application might remain able to emit (a) malicious
packet(s) to its remote peer(s), if it is authorized. But, at the
same time, this application can be prevented from attacking
other components, which it is not authorized to communicate
with. Creating this security policy is already a difficult task,
requiring detailed knowledge of possible communication paths
between all possible components of the system. When consid-
ering an evolving system, which shall be updatable (whereby
component interactions may change), this task becomes even
more difficult and requires a framework which supports policy
generation under concurrent change.
Our approach in addressing this challenge is to build the
security policy gradually by integrating it through the design
and life cycle of software components. By doing so, the
security policy will adapt to changing circumstances during
development, integration, and maintenance. Moreover, we will
preserve the intentions of the initial designer and ensure the
requirements of the actual operational platform. Policy-based
communications allow the system to decouple the rules that
govern application behavior from the application’s function-
ality, this provides the flexibility to change the application
governed behavior without the need to recording system func-
tionality upon changes. We implemented a framework which
used to enforce the defined policy based communications to
control the different kinds of communications through the
internal network of the vehicle.
II. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
As described in the introduction, a modern vehicle features
a large number of ECUs, which communicate via network
(intra vehicle network) which we assume to be transparently
shared between the ECUs, sensors, and other components.
This internal network of the vehicle has already been target
of several security attacks [12]. In one example, an attacker
intercepted the connection between different ECUs, spoofed
the transferred data and emitted false data [10]. In some
circumstances, attackers were also able to participate in the
communication by fraudulently using the identity of a legit
network node. Although ensuring the integrity of exchanged
messages between different ECUs inside the vehicle to prevent
the message manipulation and replay attacks on the in-vehicle
network is already a challenge, still authorization mechanisms
are required, which specify permissions and prohibitions to
deny malicious ends from performing unprivileged actions or
accessing unauthorized resources.
The main challenge in this context is to define a comprehen-
sive access control system to manage communication in the
intra vehicle network after the final integration phases in a de-
velopment process. This challenge originates from (a) the high
number of the integrated ECUs in the vehicle and complexity
of the communication between the different applications on
these ECUs and (b) a late definition of security parameters
of the different connections, because the chosen security
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Fig. 1. Exemplary functional processing chain.
parameters could violate initial requirements of applications
which were specified during the design phase. Moreover, when
considering updates of the vehicle system, while yielding
the advantage of extending the vehicle’s functionality after
deployment, updates make the maintenance of the existing
access control lists labor intensive and error prone. Each mod-
ification of the system, such as an adding new functionality,
moving functionality from one ECU to another, or changing
security parameters, requires the update of the existing access
control lists which can thus lead to configuration errors that
could allow unauthorized communication between software
components which could in turn be exploited by attackers. In
order to prevent the already described effects of unauthorized
communication of potentially malicious software components,
we propose fine grained access control mechanisms to secure
intra- and inter-ECU-communication.
a) Use Case: In our exemplary case, we consider the
research vehicle MOBILE, built at the Institute of Control
Engineering [13], for research in the field of vehicle control
and environment perception at the limits of handling. The
vehicle is equipped with multiple sensors and computers for
environment perception with the goal of providing obstacle
avoidance functionality in a static environment on a proving
ground.
While the environment perception system is mainly based
on LiDAR scanners (based on [14]), a radar sensor and a
camera will be added in the future to provide additional
information be used to monitor the environment around the
car. Data from the LiDAR sensors is used to create a map of
the static environment, which provides the basis for model-
based trajectory planning. The functional processing chain is
displayed in Fig. 1.
In order to generate trajectories for obstacle evasion, the
vehicle must acquire and pre-process sensor data (in the
case of LiDAR scanners three-dimensional point clouds). Pre-
processing is comprised of filter and segmentation algorithms,
ensuring that only relevant data is used for modeling the static
environment. In the example application, the environment
model consists of occupancy grid maps, which provide a map
of the drivable and non-drivable areas around the vehicle.
From these grid maps, a target pose can be generated for
the vehicle. A trajectory towards this target pose is planned
through the drivable areas of the environment. This trajectory
provides reference values and set-points for the control al-
gorithms which are responsible for maneuvering the vehicle
safely through the static environment.
As the environment perception subsystem relies on IP-
based Ethernet communication, we base the security model
on an according IP stack. Although, we are considering
the architecture of a research vehicle, IP-based inter ECU
communication has been proposed for automotive purposes in
earlier publications (e.g. [15]–[17]), such that the chosen setup
can be considered relevant for future automotive applications.
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III. POLICY FRAMEWORK
A. From Logical Interconnections to Actual Communications
In a component-based system, each functionality in the
vehicle is implemented through one or more interacting soft-
ware components as shown in Fig 2 (cf. [18]). Each atomic
component encapsulates different software methods which
provide its functionality, behavior, and expose well-defined
service interfaces. We assume that a software component can
be instantiated multiple times to provide different functionality
(e.g. library components for network access). At the same
time, functionality can be distributed to multiple ECU’s such
that software components of the same functionality must
communicate over the network (cf. Fig 2).
On the one hand, this composability provides the system in-
tegrator with several degrees of freedom for mapping software
components of the processing chain to the available ECUs
to satisfy different system requirements, e.g. by mapping a
component to a remote ECU because of the restricted memory
in the local ECU. On the other hand, this makes specifying the
communication policy of the components and determining the
non-functional concerns (such as real-time constraints, safety,
and security requirements) of these defined connections an
exhausting operation. Moreover, distributing the functional
blocks over several ECUs, due to the assumed transparent
communication mechanisms, requires an instantiation of net-
work proxy components during system integration process to
enable transparent communication of the network components
[18]. These proxy components are usually simple in the
sense of their source code complexity. However, they expose
additional security weaknesses, particularly as the proxies
must respect the both component’s requirements.
Due to these facts, we propose to build the security com-
munication policy incrementally by integrating it through the
design and life cycle of software components, respectively. By
doing so, we guarantee that the components’ security require-
ments are conserved over the different phases (i.e. design,
implementation, integration, etc.). Moreover, this allows de-
coupling the design phase from the integration phase, which is
the goal of the project CCC [19], from a security point of view
by decoupling communication policy from the components’
source code.
To explain how this security framework could be applied,
we take the use case of environment perception which was
explained in Section II as an example. Fig. 3 shows an extract
from the functional processing chain, the required software
components as well as a possible distribution of software
components over several ECUs for the application at hand.
In the scope of the CCC project, we consider a partially
automated V-Model-like development process [19]. Thus we
assume that functional requirements are formulated at the
beginning of a development process and that security require-
ments will be formulated during requirement refinement in
the implementation process. From functional requirements, a
functional system architecture is derived, including services
over which the functional blocks need to communicate. For
our approach, we also assume that functionality can be
mapped to different hardware platforms later in the devel-
opment process. For this reason, already the coarse functional
interfaces must already be attributed with security require-
ments. The designer can specify some of the link parameters
at this stage, such as the security level of the connection,
regardless of how an actual implementation might look like.
During implementation, when a software architecture is
developed, the generic functional (or logical) interfaces are
mapped to actual service interfaces which connect the differ-
ent software components (cf. Fig. 3). Required and provided
services are specified [18] and security requirements, which
arise from implementation-specific considerations can be at-
tributed to the service interfaces.
Eventually, when mapping the software architecture to a
distributed system of ECUs, additional security requirements
arise due to the need to communicate over network. At this
design stage, security requirements will again be refined and
annotated to the service interfaces.
In our example, the process for the development of the
environment perception processing chain would look as fol-
lows: The designer of the functionality for Static Environment
Modeling (SEM) specifies, that the functionality requires a
service from Sensor Data Preprocessing (SDP) to receive
segmented point clouds and provides a environment model
over a service to Target Pose Generation (TPG) (cf. Fig.3). We
use the ”≥” expression to indicate that the minimum required
protection for this link is integrity.
f u n c t i o n SEM {
s e r v i c e s {
p r o v i d e s s r v g r i d l a y e r u p d a t e d {
s e c u r i t y l e v e l ≥ I n t e g r i t y ;
}
r e q u r i e s s r v p c s e g m e n t e d {
s e c u r i t y l e v e l ≥ I n t e g r i t y ;
}
}
}
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In the same manner, the designer of Target Pose Generation
(TPG) functionality defines that the function requires a service
(”srv grid layer updated”). It is important to note that at this
stage the designer is not concerned about how the two ends
of any connection will be mapped and the type of the bus
system over which the data will be exchanged. Moreover, the
designer could determine the time constraints of the connec-
tion by specifying maximum acceptable latencies (e.g. in
this case maximum latency of 2 ms), as presented in [20].
After having specified the functional dependencies, the actual
implementation of the components can be annotated in the
same way, providing information which component provides
and requires which services.
f u n c t i o n TPG {
component t a r g e t p o s e g e n e r a t o r {
s e r v i c e s {
r e q u i r e s s r v g r i d l a y e r u p d a t e d {
s e c u r i t y l e v e l ≥ I n t e g r i t y ;
t i m i n g 2 g r o u n d d e t e c t i o n ;
}
}
}
}
With the implementation at hand, the software architecture
can then be mapped to different ECUs in the integration
process. The integrator of a specific functionality takes the
designer’s policy for each component to check the required
services for this component and search for the components
that provide these services which must be integrated. The
integrator can access this information from a local repository
which contains all related-platform properties of the integrated
components. The integration process may occur in multiple
intermediate phases, during each one of these subphases more
details could be added to the policy. At the end of these
phases, the logical and the inter-component connections which
were defined in the design phase are translated to actual
communication mechanisms available on the platform. This
includes IPC mechanisms or network communication via a
network proxy as shown in Fig. 3.
In the given example, the integrator of the components
implementing the TPG functionality updates the communi-
cation policy between TPG and GLS by adding the actual
location (i.e. IP address and ports numbers) of the both
components in the platforms. Moreover, the knowledge about
the components’ mapping gives the integrator the ability to
adjust the connection and specify the security protocol which
is supported by the link.
f u n c t i o n TPG {
component t a r g e t p o s e g e n e r a t o r {
s e r v i c e s {
r e q u i r e s s r v g r i d l a y e r u p d a t e d {
s e c u r i t y l e v e l ≥ I n t e g r i t y ;
s e c u r i t y p r o t o c o l AH;
b i t r a t e y ;
ECUs {
l o c a l ECU1 ;
remote ECU2 ;
}
I P s {
l o c a l ECU1 IP ;
remote ECU2 IP ;
}
p o r t s {
l o c a l P1 ;
remote P2 ;
}
}
}
}
}
We note here that the local parameters (e.g. local IP, local
port, etc.) refer to the ECU where the request will be evaluated
later (i.e. where the component was mapped).
B. Updating a Component
In the previous section, we showed how the creation of
the security policy could take place in the lab during the
production of the vehicle. However, in-field updates are be-
coming ever more popular as demonstrated by the recent
over the air update as Tesla cars and others [19]. Regarding
security, the platform should thus ensure the integration of new
components without putting the vehicle in a risk of violating
the system requirement or creating a vulnerability regarding
communication and access control rules. We propose an
integration procedure as shown in Fig. 4.
The platform receives a application description package
which contains: the new software components, a signed hash
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Fig. 4. Communication policy during update an existing component.
value which ensures the authenticity of the application, the
design-level credentials, and integration specifications which
specify where the component should be mapped. The sys-
tem’s middleware checks the required services that the new
component requires (based on the design-level credentials)
and determines whether the required application is mapped
to the same platform or to a remote platform. The integration
component provides an identity for the new application and
publishes its information (public key, service name, host ECU,
and etc.) via a service name repository. Each ECU contains a
service name repository to provide the information about the
other services and to broadcast the information of the newly
added component to keep the other repositories updated.
Regarding the platform where the remote application was
mapped, the integration component provides the application
with the capability to communicate with local applications or
with a proxy with required credentials to use the network.
C. Maintaining Policy Provenance
We have seen how the communication policy can be defined
at the designer level in an abstract way, and how policy
parameters are modified incrementally during implementa-
tion. In such hierarchy, the refined communication policy
parameters need to be consistent with existing one in the
previous phases, therefore ensuring the provenance of the
communication policy during the policy refinement is a crucial
goal [21]. We build a trust management module based on
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to build trust relations
which provide delegation between the multiple entities who
participate in developing the communication policy (e.g. a
Functionality Designer (F D), Integrator (I), etc).
Each one of these entities is identified by a public and a
secret key. The trust relation is explained in Fig. 5-b, where
the trustor entity authorizes a trustee entity under specific
conditions. The conditions could be a set of pairs seperated by
a logical operations (i.e. &, ‖). Each pair represents a defined
communication variable and its desired value, operators such
as ≤, ≥, <, >, 6=, or == are used to express the relationship
between each variable and its value. The security credential
could be derived from the trust relation as follows:
T r u s t o r : T r u s t o rpk
T r u s t e e : T r u s t e epk
C o n d i t i o n :{ v a r 1 == v a l 1 & v a r 2 > v a l 2 }
S i g n a t u r e : S ig wi th T r u s t o rsk
The security credential which states the public keys of the
trustor and trustee as well as the conditions, is signed by the
secret key of the trustor entity to ensure the policy integrity
The goal of creating such policy is different than the purpose
of a certificate [22]. The certificate only authenticates the
owners key; it does not prove its trustworthiness.
Fig. 5-a illustrates trust and delegation between the different
entities. E.g. in the vehicular domain, an OEM starts the
production of a specific vehicle model (e.g. Vxy), requiring
a set of functionality. Each designer of these functionali-
ties is authorized for providing its functionality. Whenever
a connection is required between components in different
functionalities, a chain of trust is established between the
two functionality designers. Later, the trust is passed to
the integrators, applications, and to the platform where the
applications are running. By building this trust we creating a
chain of trust between the requester and trusted root which
is defined in the local policy of the receiver. The receiver
authorizes the request if a trust path between the requester
and its trusted root can be found.
D. Communication and Policy Enforcement
The distributed nature of a vehicular E/E system’s com-
ponents makes the use of single ECUs for evaluating the
communications credentials and enforce the communication
policy infeasible. Therefore, we aim to enforce communica-
tion policy in a distributed manner by adopting a distributed
firewall technique (cf. [23]) so that we equip each ECU
with its own security module which acts as a connection
ingress policy checker by vetting the incoming and outgoing
communication and to enforce the distributed security policy
locally. The security module within each ECU contains two
main modules: a Communication Module (CM) and Policy
Evaluation Module (PEM). CM represents the unique interface
which enables the applications to reach the internal vehicle
network. However, there is no application component which
has a direct access to the CM. All communications need to
go through the application’s proxy. On the other hand, CM
represents the policy enforcement point where it intercepts
each incoming and outgoing packet’s selectors (i.e. IP, Port,
etc.) and applies the relevant security rule (i.e. pass, deny). The
PEM is used to evaluate the incoming connection. Its role is
limited to the connection setup stage to check the validity of
the request.
Connection setup is illustrated in in Fig. 6. We consider that
App1, which is located on ECU1, is supposed to initzialize
communication with App2, which is assigned to a different
ECU (i.e ECU2). Whenever App2 on ECU1 establishes a
connection (i.e use a connect socket call), the proxy intercepts
this call and redirects it to the communication module. The
proxy also delivers all required credentials (Crs) to vouch
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for the local ECU to communicate with the remote ECU
and deliver the request. Moreover, it prepares all the required
assertions (Asrt) which will be needed by the remote coun-
terpart to evaluate the request. A session key (SeeK) could be
chosen by the App1 proxy to later be used as a symmetric
key to secure communication between App1 and App2 after
validating the request. This key will be changed at a later
point in regular intervals. This key is encrypted by the remote
application public key (App2pk) to prevent any third party
from perceiving it during the request transmission.
CM on ECU1 uses the private key (ECU1sk) ECU1 to
sign the received assertion alongside with a monotonic counter
value (C) to ensure communication integrity. This monotonic
counter value (C) is used to guarantee that messages are up-
to-date and to prevent replay attacks. The signed assertion
with the timestamp, the ECU’s public key (ECU1pk) and
the credentials are all sent to the remote communication
counterpart (i.e. ECU2). The communication module in the
ECU2 deliver the received request and the credentials to the
PEM to evaluate them based on the local communication
policy, If the request is authorized by ECU2’s PEM, a new
security rule will be added to the CM. This rule includes all
the communication identifiers such as the local and remote
IP, local and remote applications port, remote public key, the
required security service (i.e. integrity, confidentiality), access
control role (i.e. authorize, deny), an identifier for the session
key, and others. Later, CM on ECU2 sends the answer of the
request to the remote CM. In case of authorized connections, a
similar rule is added to the communication module of ECU1.
IV. EVALUATION
a) Implementation: For implementation of the properties
described in the last section, we apply the Keynote policy
definition language [24] for creating credentials and security
policies, as well as to build relationships that provide au-
thorization of security actions. The security module which
is used to evaluate the defined credentials and policies are
implemented with in a Genode microkernel OS [25]. The
use of Genode allows us to leverage its efficient message-
passing capabilities for the enforcement of the socket APIs of
the different application, by replacing direct calls with inter-
process communications calls (IPC) that are implemented via
the Genode message-passing mechanism. The implemented
proxy is responsible to translate the socket calls to the proper
IPC call and redirect it either to the CM or to a local
application in the same platform. Proxy provides an efficient
and flexible access control layer to enforce the security policy
between the applications [26]. The CM contains light weight
TCP/IP network stack (LWIP) and embedded IPsec protocol
[27] which is used mainly to provide the communication
integrity. The Keynote library is used to implement the PEM.
b) Evaluation: To evaluate our policy scheme, we used
a prototype implementation of the security framework to
measure the introduced overhead of credential verification.
We evaluated our module regarding its overhead in terms of
required memory and latency. Our test platform is comprised
of two Raspberry PI 2 model B. Both platforms are running
Genode OS and our framework, communicating over a local
network. We used a Raspberry Pi (RPi) platform to show
adaptability of our framework to an embedded platform with
limited processing power and memory.
Regarding latency, we measure the average elapsed time
to initiate a connection between the two RPis using our
communication scheme and compare it to the needed time
to connect with the absence of policy decision module.
The introduced overhead is introduced from two parts: the
necessary time to transmit the required credentials and time
overhead of the request evaluation. At the same time, we
want to show the effect of the number of the credentials to
evaluate on transmission and request evaluation times. In this
respect, Fig. 7 shows the overhead observed from transmitting
and evaluating the credentials, it shows the base overhead
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TABLE I
COMPONENTS SIZE
component size KB
1 credential 1.2
Public Key 0.38
Private Key 1.6
Policy 0.5
signed request 0.8
of the network stcak on the RPi without the use of our
security module. Each time we used a different number of
credetinals (i.e. from 1 to 6) to evaluate the performance. We
could notice that increasing the number of delegations (i.e.
credentials numbers) introduces more overhead in both parts
(i.e. evaluation and transmition).
Other than that, we evaluated the overhead in size for
the transmitted messages. Table I defines the size for each
required file to set up the connections ( i.e. credentials, public
key, signed request). From the same table, we can estimate
the required saving size for each application within 1-level of
delegation which is around 3.7 KB (i.e. the size of credential,
keys). we can estimate the size of the transited data for the
evaluations which is also around 2.9 KB (i.e. credential, public
key, signed request).
One important aspect to notice at this point is that network
performance of the available network stack on the hardware
platform already introduces performance issues which is il-
lustrated in Fig. 7. This related to the USB driver used with
RPI and the way of processing the high interrupt load on the
system which interferes with the network stack [27]. Most of
the evaluation overhead comes from the signature verification
of the credentials; we can lessen this overhead by caching
the verified credentials and used it later with out the need to
verify its signature again.
V. RELATED WORK
The security issues in the intra vehicle network was the
topic for many research [28], [29]. Many authors indicate
the need for access control framework to control the com-
munications of the intra vehicle network [30], [31]. However,
few solutions have been suggested. Wolf et al. [32] proposed
the use of a centralized gateway to interconnect the different
existing bus systems in the vehicle. This gateway was used
as a firewall to intercept the exchanged communication. Such
a gateway could be also used to ensure the valid behavior of
exchanged message regarding the time constraints based on
a given policy as in [33]. Using a central security gateway
could protect the intra vehicle network, while having it some
limitations: Firstly, gateway provides an attack surface which
may be considered as a single point of failure. Moreover,
the internal communication inside each subnet is still not
controlled. Chutorash [34] proposes an approach for using a
firewall to control the interaction in the vehicle communica-
tion. The approach is restricted to monitoring the interaction
between human-machine interface systems and other vehicle
components, which ignored controlling the interaction be-
tween the vehicles components. In both previous frameworks,
the mechanism to define the access control rules of the firewall
is not discussed. Zrelli et al. [35] implemented access control
rules at both the data link layer and the network layer.
Blaze et al. [36] invented the concept of Trust Management
to solve access control problems in distributed systems. They
proposed a language (i.e. Keynote language [24]) to express
the access control rule the security policy. However, many
other languages serve the same purpose such as XACML [37]
and SPL [38]. At the same time, KeyNote provides several
advantages, such as the delegation mechanism. Many authors
adopt the trust management concept to implement an access
control framework in many fields, such as web applications
[39], distributed firewall [23], and others.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our work is based on the observation that controlling
the communications between different applications within a
vehicular platform is a necessary prerequisite in containing
an attack and preserving the security of the intra-vehicle net-
work. However, defining a static communications policy for a
vehicular distributed system is both labor-intensive and error-
prone and it becomes more difficult if it is performed during
the final integration. We proposed a methodology supporting
a gradual definition of the security policy, starting with the
designer of the component, and then adapting and specializing
the policy as the component is linked to other components
and is integrated with the rest of the system. Additionally, we
created a framework which allows communication policy to
be deployed incrementally and ensures integrity of this policy
during the life cycle of software components.
The advantage of using a policy definition language for the
expression of the vehicular communications policy is that we
have a lot of expressive power which is reflected in our ability
to refine and extend the original component policy during
integration while ensuring that the adaptations are consistent
with the original policy. By creating a “chain of trust” from
the original designer to the production system, we ensure the
consistent application of the security policy without the need
for manual intervention
Maintaining the security policy enforcement mechanism on
the operational vehicle does not impose excessive performance
burden as demonstrated by the results from the preceding
section. There we noted that the credential evaluation, whose
overhead is shown in Fig. 7, is done once per link setup.
This operation usually takes place during power on, although,
caching of policy may allow results from previous configu-
rations to be reused, further reducing the effort. Credential
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evaluation is not repeated, unless the system is reconfigured.
Moreover, re-keying the session key, which is done at regular
intervals, does not require a credential evaluation operation.
Even in cases where during operation, a vehicle may face a
failure and need to switch from a primary system to a backup
system, the necessary policy may be already in place. We
expect that reconfiguration will be done only when the vehicle
is quiescent.
Once the secure channels are setup, the overheads are
similar to the statically configured case. Moreover, since we
are more concerned about mutual authentication and integrity,
rather than confidentiality (although the policy caters for that,
if needed), most of the communications will not involve
encryption and will present a much lighter load to the system.
Finally, we address the issue of key storage and signing
operations through the use of a dedicated crypto module,
which will be responsible for all crypto operations and for
storing the keys, or by placing the crypto code in a trusted
environment, e.g. the ARM TrustZone technology.
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